Inflation persistence and robust monetary policy design by Coenen, Günter
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK
WORKING PAPER SERIES
ECB EZB EKT BCE EKP
WORKING PAPER NO.  290
INFLATION PERSISTENCE 
AND ROBUST MONETARY 
POLICY DESIGN
BY GÜNTER COENEN
November 20031 The paper has benefited from presentations at the meeting of the Society of Computational Economics in Aix-en-Provence, the Annual Congress of the Verein für Socialpolitik in
Zürich, the Bank of Finland/CEPR Workshop on “Heterogenous Information and Modeling of Monetary Policy” in Helsinki and a seminar held at the ECB in Frankfurt. Useful
comments and suggestions from Ignazio Angeloni, Paul Levine, Juha Kilponen, Frank Smets, Harald Uhlig and Volker Wieland are gratefully acknowledged.The opinions expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect views of the European Central Bank.Any remaining errors are of course the sole responsibility of the author.This paper
can be downloaded without charge from http://www.ecb.int or from the Social Science Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=487468.
2 Correspondence: Günter Coenen, Directorate General Research, European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany, phone: +49 69 1344-7887,
e-mail:gunter.coenen@ecb.int.
WORKING PAPER NO.  290
INFLATION PERSISTENCE 







WORKING PAPER SERIES© European Central Bank, 2003
Address Kaiserstrasse 29
D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Postal address Postfach 16 03 19
D-60066 Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Telephone +49 69 1344 0
Internet http://www.ecb.int
Fax +49 69 1344 6000
Telex 411 144 ecb d
All rights reserved.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank.
The statement of purpose for the ECB Working Paper Series is available form the ECB website, http://www.ecb.int.
ISSN 1561-0810 (print)





2 Two models of inflation determination 12
2.1 The behavioural equations 12
2.2 Implications for the transmission of monetary policy 17
3 Evaluating the performance of monetary policy rules 20
3.1 The methodology 21
3.2 Optimised benchmark rules 23
4 The Robustness of Optimised Monetary Policy Rules 25
4.1 Uncertainty about the forecasting model 26
4.2 Uncertainty about the rule-generating model 28
5 Designing robust monetary policy rules 31




European Central Bank working paper series 50Abstract
This paper investigates the performance of optimised interest rate rules when there is un-
certainty about a key determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism, namely the
degree of persistence characterising the inﬂation process. The paper focuses on the euro
area and utilises two variants of an estimated small-scale macroeconomic model featur-
ing distinct types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations which induce quite diﬀerent degrees
of inﬂation persistence. The paper shows that a cautious monetary policy-maker is well-
advised to design and implement interest rate policies under the assumption that inﬂation
persistence is high when uncertainty about the prevailing degree of inﬂation persistence is
pervasive.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E31, E52, E58, E61
Keywords: macroeconomic modelling, staggered contracts, inﬂation persistence, monetary
policy rules, robustness, euro area
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This paper investigates the performance of monetary policy rules when the monetary policy-
maker is faced with uncertainty about the degree of persistence characterising the inﬂation
process. The degree of inﬂation persistence represents a key determinant of the monetary
transmission mechanism and has important implications for the ability of monetary policy to
stabilise inﬂation relative to output. Hence, monetary policy rules should ideally be designed
to perform reasonably well under a range of alternative models of inﬂation determination
which diﬀer with respect to the degree of persistence that they induce.
To examine the consequences of diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence for the perfor-
mance of monetary policy rules, we concentrate on the euro area for which such an exam-
ination seems particularly relevant as the single monetary policy of the European Central
Bank (ECB) has to focus on the euro area as a whole being a new and relatively unexplored
territory. We utilise two variants of the small-scale euro area model developed by Coenen
and Wieland (2003) which feature diﬀerent types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations: the
nominal wage contracting speciﬁcation due to Taylor (1980) and the relative real wage
contracting speciﬁcation originally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and adapted to
empirical work by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). Coenen and Wieland show that both types of
speciﬁcation describe historical euro area data reasonably well.
In terms of methodology, the paper builds on recent work by Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999, 2003) evaluating the performance and robustness of simple monetary policy
rules across ﬁve diﬀerent models of the U.S. economy. This methodology involves imple-
menting simple reaction functions describing the response of the short-term nominal interest
rate to inﬂation and the output gap, either observed or forecast, and then optimising over
the respective response coeﬃcients. The performance of these optimised interest rate rules
is then evaluated with regard to their ability to stabilise inﬂation and output around their
targets, while avoiding undue ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate itself.
Unlike the papers by Levin, Wieland and Williams, this paper focuses on one particular
determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism, namely the degree of inﬂation per-
sistence that is induced by alternative models of inﬂation determination. Thus, while Levin,
Wieland and Williams consider a larger set of models which exhibit substantial diﬀerences
in theoretical speciﬁcation, in degree of aggregation, in estimation sample and in estima-
tion methodology, we control for all diﬀerences except for the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation
persistence induced by the two distinct staggered contracts speciﬁcations. As a result, any
diﬀerences in our ﬁndings can be attributed to the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence
induced by the two staggered contracts speciﬁcations.
Following the methodology proposed by Levin, Wieland and Williams, we ﬁrst evaluate
the stabilisation performance of both outcome and forecast-based interest rate rules that are
designed for each of the two staggered contracts speciﬁcations separately. We then examine
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  5the robustness of these optimised interest rate rules in a situation when the monetary
policy-maker does not know which of the two staggered contracts speciﬁcations represents
the “true” model of the inﬂation process. Speciﬁcally, we consider two diﬀerent scenarios.
In the ﬁrst scenario, the policy-maker is faced with uncertainty regarding the choice of the
forecasting model needed to implement a given forecast-based interest rate rule. In the
second scenario, the policy-maker faces the even more profound uncertainty as to which of
the two contracting speciﬁcations to rely upon when designing interest rate rules.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that it may be dangerous to rely too heavily on
interest rate rules which are implemented and/or designed under the assumption that the
degree of inﬂation persistence is low. Following the prescriptions of such rules may result
in disastrous stabilisation outcomes if the true inﬂation process turns out to be much more
persistent. In contrast, rules which are implemented and/or designed under the assumption
that the degree of inﬂation persistence is relatively high also perform reasonably well if
inﬂation is considerably less persistent. Hence, a cautious monetary policy-maker is well-
advised to take monetary policy decision under the assumption that the inﬂation process
is characterised by a high degree of persistence until strong evidence in favour of a low-
persistence regime has emerged. In this context, we illustrate that using pooled forecasts
rather than relying on a single model’s inﬂation forecast can serve as a simple means to insure
the policy-maker at least against the risks arising from the use of the wrong forecasting
model, regardless of the prevailing degree of inﬂation persistence.
Finally, we identify the key operating characteristics of simple interest rate rules that
are robust to the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence induced by the two staggered
contracts speciﬁcations under investigation. To this end, we optimise the simple interest
rate rules across the alternative staggered contracts speciﬁcations simultaneously. Our
results conﬁrm previous ﬁndings by Levin, Wieland and Williams: robust rules respond to
inﬂation and output gap forecasts with horizons that do not extend too far into the future
and also incorporate a substantial degree of interest rate inertia. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that
a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule which relates changes in the short-term nominal interest rate to the
one-year ahead forecast of inﬂation and the current output gap already goes a long way
towards making monetary policy robust to the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence that
are induced by the two types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations. To the extent that such
a rule performs remarkably well under both staggered contracts speciﬁcations and in light
of the large uncertainty about how to model euro area inﬂation, we tentatively conclude
that such a rule may serve as a useful benchmark for model-based evaluations of monetary
policy in the euro area.
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There is an active and rapidly growing literature on the evaluation of structural models of
inﬂation determination.1 While theoretical models, starting with the staggered contracts
models of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), propose that current inﬂation depends on future
inﬂation and a measure of current excess demand, recent empirical research has highlighted
that these models, in their simplest speciﬁcation, typically fail to explain the degree of
inﬂation persistence observed in the data. This failure has been documented most promi-
nently by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) who rejected Taylor’s nominal wage contracting model
for U.S. inﬂation data and found strong empirical evidence in favour of the relative real
wage contracting model originally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) which induces a
considerably higher degree of inﬂation persistence.
More recently, Taylor (2000) and Cogley and Sargent (2001) have observed that the
degree of persistence in U.S. inﬂation has been drifting downward in the 1980s and 1990s
as inﬂation has come under control.2 Taylor (2000) suggests that the diminished degree of
inﬂation persistence may be due to changes in the orientation of monetary policy. In a low-
inﬂation regime with credible monetary policy, inﬂation expectations may become contained
and, hence, price and wage setters may be less inclined to change their contracts in response
to shocks. Similarly, Brayton, Roberts and Williams (1999) argue that globalisation has
increased competition in the products markets, thereby squeezing mark-ups and yielding
reductions in prices. Although Staiger, Stock and Watson (2001) do not ﬁnd empirical
evidence in favour of such theories that place considerable weight on changes in price and
wage-setting behaviour when revisiting U.S. wage and price inﬂation in the 1990s, more
favourable evidence may emerge as data from the low-inﬂation regime accumulate.
In the light of the ongoing controversy about the appropriate speciﬁcation of structural
1See for example the evaluations by Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2002) and Rudd and Whelan
(2002) for the United States and the studies by Gal´ ı, Gertler and L´ opez-Salido (2001) and Coenen and
Wieland (2003) for the euro area.
2In line with this observation, recent work by Guerrieri (2002) suggests that even Taylor-style contracts
are not rejected for U.S. data once the estimation period is extended to the more recent past.
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ﬂation may have altered, this paper investigates the performance of simple monetary policy
rules when the monetary policy-maker is faced with uncertainty about the degree of persis-
tence characterising the inﬂation process. The degree of inﬂation persistence represents a
key determinant of the monetary transmission mechanism and has important implications
for the ability of monetary policy to stabilise inﬂation relative to output. Hence, monetary
policy rules should ideally be designed to perform reasonably well under a range of alter-
native models of inﬂation determination which diﬀer with respect to the degree of inﬂation
persistence that they induce.
To examine the consequences of diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence for the perfor-
mance of monetary policy rules, we concentrate on the euro area for which such an exam-
ination seems particularly relevant as the single monetary policy of the European Central
Bank (ECB) has to focus on the euro area as a whole being a new and relatively unexplored
territory. We utilise two variants of the small-scale euro area model developed by Coenen
and Wieland (2003) which feature diﬀerent types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations: the
nominal wage contracting speciﬁcation due to Taylor (1980) and the relative real wage
contracting speciﬁcation originally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and adapted to
empirical work by Fuhrer and Moore (1995).3 Both types of contracting speciﬁcation are
found to describe historical euro area data reasonably well.
Comparing the euro area results to those obtained for France, Germany and Italy sepa-
rately, Coenen and Wieland (2003) show that the relative real wage contracting speciﬁcation
does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a high inﬂation regime such as France
and Italy, while the nominal wage contracting speciﬁcation describes German data better
3Thus, the estimated small-scale euro area model belongs to the class of New-Keynesian models which
have gained increased popularity in macroeconomic modelling over the recent years. This class of models
includes most of the smaller-scale models currently used for research on monetary policy (see for example
the backward-looking model of Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), the models with rational expectations and
nominal rigidities of Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Fuhrer (1997) and Orphanides and Wieland (1998)) and the
models with optimising agents of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997, 1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999)),
as well as large-scale policy models such as the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/U.S. model (see Brayton and
Tinsley (1996)), the ECB’s Area-Wide Model (see Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)) or the multi-country
model of Taylor (1993a).
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attributed to diﬀerent degrees of nominal rigidity in the price and wage-setting behaviour
across economies, but it may also reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of credibility of the respective
monetary regimes over the estimation period. The estimation results with German data
also provide indirect empirical support for the thesis that the degree of inﬂation persistence
is lower in a stable monetary regime with low average inﬂation, because of the reduced
pricing power of ﬁrms as suggested by Taylor (2000).
Thus, as far as the future of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is concerned, the
estimation based on historical euro area data may overstate the case for the relative real
wage contracting model. In this case, nominal rigidities ` a la Taylor may provide a bet-
ter description of the inﬂation process than Fuhrer-Moore-type rigidities and, in terms of
evaluating alternative monetary policy strategies, a policy-maker who is optimistic about
the output losses associated with stabilising inﬂation may prefer to use the nominal wage
contracting speciﬁcation, while a pessimist may prefer the relative real wage contracting
speciﬁcation. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the determination of euro area
inﬂation in the future, however, a robust monetary policy strategy for the euro area should
perform reasonably well under both contracting speciﬁcations.4
In terms of methodology, this paper builds on recent work by Levin, Wieland and
Williams (1999, 2003) – henceforth referred to as LWW (1999, 2003) – evaluating the per-
formance and robustness of simple monetary policy rules across ﬁve diﬀerent models of the
U.S. economy.5 This methodology involves implementing simple reaction functions describ-
ing the response of the short-term nominal interest rate to inﬂation and the output gap,
either observed or forecast, and then optimising over the respective response coeﬃcients.
4Another hypothesis, though with similar consequences, is that due to heterogeneity in the persistence of
the national inﬂation rates in the countries that form the countries of the euro area, the use of aggregated
euro area inﬂation data induces an upward bias in the estimated degree of inﬂation persistence. The latter
would be an empirical artefact and therefore considered misleading as regards the evaluation of alternative
monetary policy strategies.
5There are alternative approaches to analysing the consequences of uncertainty about the structure of the
economy (see for example Giannoni (2002), Hansen and Sargent (2002), Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski
and Williams (2003) and Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001)). This coexistence of alternative approaches
reﬂects that there has not yet emerged a consensus on how to address the issue of model uncertainty.
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  9The performance of these optimised interest rate rules is then evaluated with regard to
their ability to stabilise inﬂation and output around their targets, while avoiding undue
ﬂuctuations in the nominal interest rate itself.6
Unlike the papers by LWW, this paper focuses on one particular determinant of the mon-
etary transmission mechanism, namely the degree of inﬂation persistence that is induced
by alternative models of inﬂation determination. Thus, while LWW consider a larger set of
models which exhibit substantial diﬀerences in theoretical speciﬁcation, in degree of aggre-
gation, in estimation sample and in estimation methodology, we control for all diﬀerences
except for the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence induced by the two distinct staggered
contracts speciﬁcations. As a result, any diﬀerences in our ﬁndings can be attributed to the
diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence induced by the two contracting speciﬁcations.7
We start our analysis by comparing the characteristics of inﬂation and output gap dy-
namics under the two staggered contracts speciﬁcations with an empirical benchmark policy
rule imposed. To this end, we report the responses of inﬂation and the output gap to an
unexpected tightening of monetary policy to illustrate the diﬀerences in the transmission
of monetary policy. Our subsequent analysis proceeds in two steps. Following the method-
ology proposed by LWW, we ﬁrst evaluate the stabilisation performance of both outcome
and forecast-based interest rate rules which are designed for each of the two staggered
contracts speciﬁcations separately. We then examine the robustness of these optimised in-
terest rate rules in a situation when the monetary policy-maker does not know which of the
two staggered contracts speciﬁcations represents the “true” model of the inﬂation process.
Speciﬁcally, we consider two diﬀerent scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, the policy-maker is
faced with uncertainty regarding the choice of the forecasting model needed to implement
a given forecast-based interest rate rule. In the second scenario, the policy-maker faces the
6Earlier studies of the performance of interest rate rules across a range of macroeconomic models of the
U.S. economy are provided in Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999).
7Our study is related to recent work by J¨ a¨ askel¨ a (2002) on the implications of inﬂation persistence
for the design of optimal monetary policy. However, while we evaluate the performance of both outcome
and forecast-based interest rate rules in an empirically estimated model of the euro area with two distinct
supply-side speciﬁcations, J¨ a¨ askel¨ a focuses on the performance of outcome-based interest rate rules in a
highly-stylised calibrated model with a hybrid Phillips curve.
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upon when designing interest rate rules.
Based on our analysis, we conclude that it may be dangerous to rely too heavily on
interest rate rules which are implemented and/or designed under the assumption that the
degree of inﬂation persistence is low. Following the prescriptions of such rules may result
in disastrous stabilisation outcomes if the true inﬂation process turns out to be much more
persistent. In contrast, rules which are implemented and/or designed under the assumption
that the degree of inﬂation persistence is relatively high also perform reasonably well if
inﬂation is considerably less persistent. Hence, a cautious monetary policy-maker is well-
advised to take monetary policy decision under the assumption that the inﬂation process
is characterised by a high degree of persistence until strong evidence in favour of a low-
persistence regime has emerged. In this context, we illustrate that using pooled forecasts
rather than relying on a single model’s inﬂation forecast can serve as a simple means to
insure the policy-maker against risks arising from the use of the wrong forecasting model,
regardless of the prevailing degree of inﬂation persistence.
Finally, we identify the key operating characteristics of simple interest rate rules that
are robust to the diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence induced by the two staggered
contracts speciﬁcations. To this end, we optimise the simple interest rate rules across the
alternative staggered contracts speciﬁcations simultaneously. Our results conﬁrm previous
ﬁndings by LWW: robust rules respond to inﬂation and output gap forecasts with horizons
that do not extend too far into the future and also incorporate a substantial degree of
interest rate inertia. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule which relates changes
in the short-term nominal interest rate to the one-year ahead forecast of inﬂation and the
current output gap already goes a long way towards making monetary policy robust to the
diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence that are induced by the two types of staggered
contracts speciﬁcations. To the extent that such a rule performs remarkably well under
both types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations and in the light of the large uncertainty
about how to model euro area inﬂation, we tentatively conclude that such a rule may serve
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  11as a useful benchmark for model-based evaluations of monetary policy in the euro area.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the behavioural
equations of the euro area model with the two distinct staggered contracts speciﬁcations
and illustrates the implied diﬀerences in inﬂation and output gap dynamics under an esti-
mated benchmark rule. Section 3 brieﬂy describes the methodology used for evaluating the
performance of simple interest rate rules and provides a set of optimised benchmark rules
for each of the two staggered contracts models. Section 4 evaluates the robustness of these
optimised rules when there is uncertainty about the forecasting and/or the rule-generating
model, while Section 5 identiﬁes the operating characteristics of simple interest rate rules
that are robust to diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence. Section 6 reports additional
sensitivity analysis and Section 7 concludes.
2 Two Models of Inﬂation Determination
To analyse the robustness of monetary policy rules when there is uncertainty about the
degree of inﬂation persistence, we utilise two variants of the small-scale euro area model
developed by Coenen and Wieland (2003). The ﬁrst variant employs the nominal wage
contracting speciﬁcation due to Taylor (1980), and the second the relative real wage contract
speciﬁcation originally proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and adapted to empirical work
by Fuhrer and Moore (1995). These two contracting speciﬁcations diﬀer with respect to the
degree of inﬂation persistence that they induce, because relative real wage contracts give
more weight to past inﬂation.8
2.1 The Behavioural Equations
The behavioural equations of the small-scale euro area model are indicated in Table 1.
As shown in model equation (M-1), the aggregate price level pt is determined as a weighted
8There are other mechanisms which have been proposed in the literature as a means to induce lag-
dependent inﬂation dynamics. For example, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) allow for a fraction of backward-
looking ﬁrms in the staggered nominal contracts model of Calvo (1983), which are assumed to follow a “rule
of thumb” when changing prices, while Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) assume that nominal
contracts are indexed to past prices.
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which are still in eﬀect in period t.9 Following Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the weights fi on
contract wages from diﬀerent periods are assumed to be a downward-sloping linear function
of contract length. This function depends on a single parameter, the slope s.
Table 1: A Small-Scale Euro Area Model with Staggered Wage Contracts
Price level pt = f0 xt + f1 xt−1 + f2 xt−2 + f3 xt−3, (M-1)
where fi =0 .25 + (1.5 − i)s, s ∈ (0, 1/6]
Contract wage
a) Taylor xt =E t
3






b) Fuhrer-Moore xt − pt =E t
3








i=0 fi (xt−i − pt−i)
Aggregate demand yt = δ1 yt−1 + δ2 yt−2 + φ(rl
t−1 − r∗)+ d
t, (M-3)






















where πt =4( pt − pt−1)
Notes: p: aggregate price level; x: nominal contract wage; y: output gap;  
x: contract wage shock; v:
real contract wage index; r
l: long-term real interest rate; r
∗: equilibrium real interest rate;  
d:a g g r e g a t e
demand shock; q: actual output; q
∗: potential output; i
l: long-term nominal interest rate; i
s:s h o r t - t e r m
nominal interest rate; π: one-quarter inﬂation. Prices, wages and output are expressed in logarithmic
form, and interest rates and inﬂation are expressed at annualised rates.
The staggered contracts models of Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore induce nominal rigidities,
because workers negotiate long-term contracts and compare the contract wage to past con-
tracts that are still in eﬀect and future contracts that will be negotiated over the life of this
9Thus, like Fuhrer and Moore (1995), we treat the aggregate price and aggregate wage indices inter-
changeably, which is consistent with a ﬁxed mark-up. For recent studies considering wage and price stickiness
separately, see Taylor (1993a), Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2000).
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in time. The distinction between Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore-type wage contracts concerns
the deﬁnition of the wage indices that form the basis of this comparison.
Under Taylor’s speciﬁcation deﬁned by equation (M-2a), the nominal wage contract xt
is negotiated with reference to the price level that is expected to prevail over the life of
the contract, pt+i, as well as the expected output gap over this period, yt+i. The operator
Et[·] indicates the model-consistent expectation of a particular variable conditional on all
information available in period t.10 Since the price indices pt+i reﬂect contemporaneous and
preceding contract wages, (M-2a) implies that wage setters look at an average of nominal
contract wages negotiated in the recent past and expected to be negotiated in the near future
when setting the current contract wage. In other words, they take into account nominal
wages that apply to overlapping contracts. If wage setters expect the output gap to be
positive, yt+i > 0, they adjust the current contract wage upwards relative to overlapping
contracts. The sensitivity of contract wages to the output gap is measured by γ. The
contract wage shock  x
t is assumed to be serially uncorrelated.
Under the Fuhrer-Moore speciﬁcation deﬁned by equation (M-2b), workers negotiating
their nominal wage compare the implied real wage expected to prevail over the life of their
contract with the real wages on overlapping contracts in the recent past and near future.
This speciﬁcation implies that the expected real wage under contracts signed in the current
period is set with reference to an average of real contract wage indices expected to prevail
over the current and the next three quarters, vt+i.11 Thus, the Fuhrer-Moore contracts
should not be understood as reﬂecting real wage rigidity, but rather as representing an
alternative nominal rigidity.
Equations (M-1) and (M-2a, M-2b) represent rules for price and contract wage-setting
10We employ the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which uses the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) method for solving linear rational expectations models, to compute model-consistent expectations.
11Here we follow Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and use the current price level in the deﬁnition of the real
contract wage instead of using the average price level expected to prevail over the life of the contract, which
would be theoretically preferable. For a more detailed discussion of variations of relative real wage contracts
see Coenen and Wieland (2003).
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not necessarily be inconsistent with such a framework. More recently, Taylor-style staggered
contracts have been analysed within more fully ﬂeshed-out dynamic general equilibrium
models (see for example Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) or King and Wolman (1999)).
Starting with a representative agent model with monopolistically competitive ﬁrms these
studies add the constraint that prices, rather than wages are set in a staggered fashion for
a ﬁxed number of periods. A log-linear approximation of a stripped-down version of these
equilibrium models then implies a contract price equation that coincides with Taylor’s
contract wage equation (M-2a) with the parameter γ being a function of deeper technology
and preference parameters. The Fuhrer-Moore contracting model, however, has typically
been criticised for lacking such microeconomic foundations.
To complete our macroeconomic model of the euro area, it remains to specify aggregate
demand and the transmission of monetary policy. As regards the determination of aggregate
demand, equation (M-3) relates the output gap, i.e. the deviation of actual output from its
potential, yt = qt −q∗
t, to two lags of itself and to the lagged ex-ante long-term real interest
rate, rl
t−1. Since our analysis is focused on the implications of diﬀerent types of staggered
contracts speciﬁcations we assume for simplicity that potential output q∗
t is exogenous. In
the short run, actual output qt may deviate from its long-run potential due to the nominal
rigidities arising from the staggering of contracts. The demand shock  d
t is assumed to
be serially uncorrelated. The rationale for including lags of the output gap is to account
for habit formation in consumption as well as adjustment costs and accelerator eﬀects in
investment. We use the lagged instead of the contemporaneous value of the long-term real
interest rate to allow for a transmission lag of monetary policy.
Two equations relate the long-term real interest rate rl
t to the short-term nominal interest
rate is
t which is assumed to be the principal instrument of monetary policy. First, as to
the determination of the long-term nominal interest rate il
t deﬁned by equation (M-4), we
rely on the accumulated forecasts of the short-term interest rate over two years. These
accumulated forecasts will coincide with the long-term interest rate forecast for this horizon
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  15under the expectations hypothesis of the term structure. The term premium is assumed
to be constant and equal to zero. And second, according to the Fisher relation deﬁned
by equation (M-5), we obtain the ex-ante long-term real interest rate rl
t by subtracting
inﬂation expectations over the following two years, with πt+i =4( pt+i − pt+i−1) denoting
the annualised one-quarter inﬂation rate.
Table 2: The Parameter Estimates of the Small-Scale Euro Area Model
Aggregate supply(a) sγ p -value(c)
a) Taylor 0.0456 0.0115 0.3186[2]
(0.0465) (0.0053)
b) Fuhrer-Moore 0.0742 0.0212 0.2602[2]
(0.0245) (0.0048)
Aggregate demand(b) δ1 δ2 φp -value(c)
1.1807 -0.2045 -0.0947 0.2307[5]
(0.1006) (0.1065) (0.0333)
Notes:
(a) Simulation-based indirect estimates using a VAR(3) model for the annualised one-quarter inﬂa-
tion rate and the output gap as auxiliary model. Standard errors in parentheses.
(b) GMM estimates using
a constant, lagged values of the output gap, the annualised one-quarter inﬂation rate and the short-term
nominal interest rate as instruments. Standard errors in parentheses.
(c) Probability value associated with
the test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying restrictions in brackets.
Estimates of the model’s parameters are taken from Coenen and Wieland (2003) and
summarised in Table 2. The upper panel of the table shows the estimated parameters of
the alternative price and wage setting speciﬁcations that form the supply side of the model.
As indicated by the p-values for the tests of overidentifying restrictions that were imposed
when estimating the staggered contracts speciﬁcations, neither Taylor nor Fuhrer-Moore-
type contracts can be rejected on statistical grounds. Taylor-type contracts, however, are
favoured somewhat by a higher p-value. The lower panel of the table shows the estimated
parameters of the aggregate demand equation. The coeﬃcients on the two lags of the output
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sizeable. For further details on the estimation of the model’s supply-side speciﬁcations and
its demand side we refer the reader to Coenen and Wieland (2003).
2.2 Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy
In principle, the estimated staggered contracts speciﬁcations together with the estimated
aggregate demand equation would be suﬃcient to evaluate the stabilisation performance
and robustness of alternative monetary policies. However, if we wish to know how the
diﬀerent contracting speciﬁcations would have aﬀected the transmission of monetary policy
historically we also need to specify an empirical benchmark. We could do so by estimating
a policy reaction function which captures the historical path of the euro area short-term
nominal interest rate.
Since (GDP-) weighted averages of European interest rates preceding the formation
of European Monetary Union in 1999 seem unlikely to be appropriate as a measure of
the euro area-wide historical monetary policy stance, however, we resort to estimating a
reaction function for the German interest rate (that we already used in estimating the
aggregate demand equation discussed above). After all, movements in German interest
rates eventually had to be mirrored by the other European countries to the extent that
they intended to maintain exchange rate parities within the European Monetary System
(EMS).12
The benchmark rule that we estimate is a forecast-based interest rate rule which relates
short-term nominal interest rates to variations of the one-year-ahead forecast of annual
inﬂation in deviation from the policy-maker’s target π∗ and the current output gap and
also allows for interest rate inertia, i.e. “smoothing”.13 We estimate a generalised form of
such a forward-looking rule allowing for up to two lags of the short-term nominal interest
12Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998) also argue that German monetary policy had a strong inﬂuence on
interest rate policy in the U.K., France and Italy throughout the EMS period. More recently, Faust, Rogers
and Wright (2001) estimate an interest rate reaction function for Germany and use it to predict the interest
rate the ECB would be setting, were it to behave like the Bundesbank.
13Work by Clarida and Gertler (1997) and Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998) suggests that German interest
rate policy since 1979 is summarised quite well by such a forecast-based interest rate rule.








t−2 +( 1− 1.0670 + 0.2764)(r∗ +E t[˜ πt+4])
+0 .1778
(0.0241)
(E t[˜ πt+4] − π∗ )+ 0 .0388
(0.0169)
yt +  is
t .
Here, is
t corresponds to the three-month money market rate, the annual inﬂation rate ˜ πt =
pt − pt−4 is the annual change in the log-level of the GDP deﬂator and the output gap
measure yt has been constructed using quarterly real GDP data and annual output gap
estimates reported in OECD (2002). r∗ again denotes the equilibrium real interest rate and
π∗ reﬂects the monetary policy-maker’s inﬂation target. The term  is
t captures unexpected
shocks to monetary policy. Motivated by earlier work of Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998),
the estimation period was chosen to start in the second quarter of 1979 with the formation
of the European Monetary System; it ends in the fourth quarter of 1998, prior to the launch
of the euro in January 1999.14
The estimated short-run response coeﬃcients in the interest rate rule capture the pat-
tern of stabilisation policy during the 1980s and 1990s in Germany. Not surprisingly, the
coeﬃcient on the one-year-ahead inﬂation forecast is sizeable, implying a long-run coeﬃcient
of about 1.85. This ensures determinacy and stability of the rational expectations equilib-
rium, when solving the model under either of the wage contracting speciﬁcations.15 The
coeﬃcient on the current output gap is a good bit smaller but positive; and the estimated
degree of interest rate smoothing turns out to be relatively high.
In the deterministic steady state of the model the output gap is zero and the short and
real interest rate equal its equilibrium value r∗. Since the alternative staggered contracts
speciﬁcations do not impose any restriction on the steady-state inﬂation rate, the latter is
14The interest rate rule has been estimated by the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) using lags up
to order three of the interest rate, one-quarter inﬂation and the output gap as instruments. In addition, the
current value and lags up to order two of the ratio of government expenditure to potential output have been
used to account for demand pressures in the aftermath of German reuniﬁcation which were at least partly
due to ﬁscal measures.
15See Woodford (2000) for a detailed discussion of the conditions regarding the size of the interest rate
response coeﬃcients on current or expected inﬂation in order to guarantee uniqueness of the rational expec-
tations equilibrium in a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model.
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003 18determined by monetary policy alone and equals the policy-maker’s target rate π∗ in the
interest rate rule.
Figure 1: Responses to an Unexpected Policy Tightening (50 Basis Points)





















Short−Term Nominal Interest Rate
Quarters





Ex−Ante Long−Term Real Interest Rate
Quarters
Figure 1 provides a comparison of the eﬀects of an unexpected tightening of monetary
policy by 50 basis points under the two diﬀerent wage contracting speciﬁcations. The upper
two panels depict the responses of annual inﬂation and the output gap, while the lower two
panels show the responses of the short-term nominal interest rate and the ex-ante long-term
real interest rate. The dashed lines refer to the responses under Taylor’s wage contracting
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  19speciﬁcation, while the dash-dotted lines correspond to the responses under the contracting
speciﬁcation due to Fuhrer and Moore. Both the equilibrium real interest rate and the
policy-maker’s inﬂation target have been normalised to zero.
Qualitatively, the tightening of policy has the same consequences under the two wage
contracting speciﬁcations. As the nominal interest rate rises unexpectedly, demand falls
short of potential and inﬂation falls below target, with the dynamic adjustment being drawn
out lastingly. Quantitatively, however, the responses exhibit some noticeable diﬀerences.
Most importantly, the disinﬂation eﬀect is considerably larger under Fuhrer-Moore-type
contracts with the timing of the peak eﬀect on inﬂation noticeably delayed relative to that
on demand. By contrast, the decline in inﬂation is less pronounced under Taylor-type
contracts and the timing of the peak eﬀects on inﬂation and output is almost identical.
These diﬀerences reﬂect that expectations regarding future inﬂation drop more sharply
and are much more persistent under Fuhrer-Moore contracts than under Taylor contracts,
as discussed in more detail in Coenen and Wieland (2003). With the nominal interest
rate being set in response to expectations of future inﬂation, the empirical benchmark rule
prescribes to lower the nominal interest rates under Fuhrer-Moore contracts more decisively
than under Taylor contracts. As a result, ex-ante long-term real interest rates rise more
strongly under the latter, inducing a more pronounced decline in demand.
Based on the documented patterns of the impulse response functions, we summarise that
a given monetary policy rule may perform quite diﬀerently in terms of inﬂation and output
gap stabilisation, depending on the type of staggered contracts. Hence, it is evident why
monetary policy-makers should be concerned about the model of inﬂation determination
when designing policies.
3 Evaluating the Performance of Monetary Policy Rules
We now proceed to describe the methodology which we will use to evaluate the stabilisation
performance of alternative monetary policies in the presence of uncertainty about the true
model of inﬂation determination. Our starting point is an evaluation of simple interest rate
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allow for inertia due to dependence on the lagged short-term nominal interest rate.
3.1 The Methodology
Following the approach in LWW (2003), we consider a parametric family of simple interest
rate rules,
is
t = ρi s
t−1 +( 1− ρ)(r∗ +E t [˜ πt+θ ])+αEt [˜ πt+θ − π∗ ]+β Et [yt+κ ],
where again is
t denotes the short-term nominal interest rate, r∗ is the equilibrium real
interest rate, ˜ πt = pt − pt−4 is the annual inﬂation rate, π∗ denotes the inﬂation target,
and yt is the output gap. Under rational expectations, the operator Et[·] indicates the
model-consistent forecast of a particular variable, using information available in period t.
The parameters θ and κ denote the length of the forecast horizons for inﬂation and the
output gap respectively. This speciﬁcation accommodates both forecast-based rules (with
forecast horizons θ,κ > 0) and outcome-based rules (θ = κ = 0) and simpliﬁes to the
one proposed by Taylor (1993b) if θ = κ = 0 and ρ = 0. For ﬁxed inﬂation and output
gap forecast horizons θ and κ, the above family of policy rules is deﬁned by the triplet of
response coeﬃcients ρ, α and β.
In our evaluation of the stabilisation performance of particular versions of the parametric
family of policy rules, we assume that the policy-maker has a standard loss function equal
to the weighted sum of the unconditional variances of inﬂation, the output gap and changes
in the short-term nominal interest rate,
L = Var[πt ]+λVar[ yt ]+µVar[ ∆is
t ].
Here, inﬂation is measured by the annualised one-quarter inﬂation rate, πt =4( pt − pt−1).
The weight λ ≥ 0 refers to the policy-maker’s preference for reducing output variability
relative to inﬂation variability, and the weight µ ≥ 0 on the variability of changes in the
short-term nominal interest rate, ∆is
t = is
t − is
t−1, reﬂects a desire to avoid undue ﬂuc-
tuations in the nominal interest rate itself. Establishing this loss function is consistent
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target π∗ and actual output around potential, with the concern regarding excessive inter-
est rate variability justiﬁed by ﬁnancial stability considerations or the risk of hitting the
zero-interest-rate bound.16,17
For ﬁxed inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons θ and κ, the parametric family of
interest rate rules deﬁned above is optimised by minimising the policy-maker’s loss function
L with respect to the triplet of coeﬃcients ρ, α and β. In this context, in order to evaluate
the policy-maker’s loss function, we repeatedly need to compute the unconditional variances
of the model’s endogenous variables for a particular interest rate rule. In preparation for
these computations, we ﬁrst identify the series of historical structural shocks that would
be consistent with the alternative contracting speciﬁcations under rational expectations
with the estimated benchmark for historical monetary policy imposed.18 B a s e do nt h e
covariance matrix of the structural shocks, it is then possible to calculate the unconditional
covariance matrix of the endogenous variables for a given interest rate rule by applying
standard methods to the reduced-form solution of the model including that rule.
In the subsequent analysis, we will consider four alternative values for the relative weight
on output gap variability, namely λ =0 ,1/2,1,2. Regarding the weight on the variability
of interest rate changes, we concentrate the analysis on a ﬁxed value of µ = 1. This weight
is relatively high, but avoids extreme and counterfactual interest rate variability under the
optimised rules. In the sensitivity analysis at the end of the paper we report additional
results for a lower weight of µ =0 .1 on interest rate variability. There, we will also brieﬂy
16For an explicit derivation of the policy-maker’s loss function L from quadratic intertemporal preferences
the reader is referred to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). In Svensson’s (1999) terminology, the case of
λ = µ = 0 corresponds to “strict” inﬂation targeting, while “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting is characterised by
λ,µ > 0.
17It is recognised that it would be beneﬁcial to use a welfare criterion derived as an approximation of
the representative agent’s utility function (see for example Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)). The weights
in this approximate welfare criterion would be functions of the parameters of the structural model itself.
However, to the extent that the model used in this paper is lacking full micro-foundations, a well-deﬁned
welfare criterion does not exist.
18The historical structural shocks diﬀer from the single-equation estimation residuals, because expectations
of future variables are computed to be consistent with the complete model, including the empirical benchmark
for monetary policy discussed in Section 2.2. The relevant sample period is 1979:Q2 to 1998:Q4, given the
estimation period for the benchmark rule.
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output gap. Such rules have been used as a proxy for actual policy in inﬂation-targeting
countries that are widely perceived as setting interest rates in response to deviations of
short to medium-term inﬂation forecasts from the target rate.19
3.2 Optimised Benchmark Rules
As a benchmark for evaluating the robustness of optimised interest rate rules under the two
alternative staggered contracts models, Table 3 reports the optimised response coeﬃcients
for a collection of outcome and forecast-based rules, together with an indication of the
stabilisation performance of these rules. Regarding the choice of the forecast-based rules,
we consider three diﬀerent combinations of forecast horizons: one-quarter-ahead and four-
quarter-ahead inﬂation forecasts combined with the current output gap, as used in many
theoretical and empirical studies in the literature; and four-quarter-ahead forecasts of both
inﬂation and the output gap. The last combination is motivated by Figure 1 above which
shows that a particular interest rate rule may lead to quite distinct proﬁles for the time
paths of inﬂation and the output gap under the two diﬀerent types of staggered contracts.
As a result, choosing the forecast horizons for both inﬂation and the output gap may have
important consequences for the stabilisation performance and robustness of interest rate
rules.
The four columns in the middle of Table 3 show the short-run response coeﬃcients and
a measure indicating the stabilisation performance of the optimised rules under Taylor-type
contracts, while the four columns on the right show the corresponding results for Fuhrer-
Moore-type contracts. Regardless of the policy-maker’s preference for output stabilisation,
we observe that the optimised rules are characterised by a substantial degree of interest
rate smoothing under both types of staggered contracts, as indicated by the high coeﬃcient
on the lagged interest rate ρ. Interestingly, with the forecast horizons extending one year
into the future, the magnitude of ρ tends to exceed unity, a feature which is known as
19See Batini and Nelson (2001) for a model-based analysis of choosing the optimal forecast horizon within
an inﬂation-targeting framework.
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Taylor contracts Fuhrer-Moore contracts
θκλ ρ α β %∆LT ραβ %∆LFM
0 0 0 0.97 0.21 0.06 2.29 0.86 0.46 0.41 1.98
1/2 0.86 0.03 0.40 3.62 0.85 0.41 0.53 1.80
1 0.85 0.04 0.57 3.35 0.83 0.39 0.62 2.01
2 0.85 0.06 0.78 3.42 0.82 0.36 0.78 2.56
1 0 0 0.98 0.23 0.05 2.90 0.89 0.45 0.35 2.16
1/2 0.86 0.03 0.40 3.83 0.87 0.40 0.46 1.94
1 0.85 0.04 0.56 3.36 0.86 0.38 0.55 2.19
2 0.84 0.06 0.78 3.27 0.84 0.35 0.70 2.85
4 0 0 1.27 1.32 -0.09 5.47 0.99 0.77 0.20 4.96
1/2 0.86 0.19 0.40 4.48 0.96 0.65 0.30 3.99
1 0.84 0.11 0.57 3.38 0.93 0.58 0.39 4.02
2 0.83 0.07 0.78 2.78 0.91 0.52 0.54 4.58
4 4 0 1.21 1.20 -0.09 5.58 1.07 1.00 0.37 4.92
1/2 0.98 0.37 0.72 4.65 1.06 0.96 0.62 3.86
1 1.00 0.33 1.21 3.80 1.07 0.96 0.87 3.82
2 1.04 0.33 2.01 3.47 1.08 1.00 1.37 4.30
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the optimised interest rate
response coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β) and the percentage point change in the policy-maker’s loss function
(%∆Lj) compared with the loss under the fully optimal policy under commitment.
“super-inertia” in the interest rate. Not surprisingly, as the weight on output stabilisation
λ increases, the coeﬃcient on the output gap β rises while the short-run coeﬃcient on the
inﬂation gap α falls, albeit less dramatically for Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts. Furthermore,
the coeﬃcients under Fuhrer-Moore-type contracts are typically a good bit larger than
under Taylor-type contracts. This reﬂects that, under Fuhrer-Moore contracts, the inﬂation
process is much harder to control and that, as a result, the policy-maker has to respond
more aggressively to any signs of rising inﬂation.
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terms as the percentage point change in the policy-maker’s loss function, %∆Lj (j =T , F M ) ,
compared with the loss under the fully optimal policy under commitment.20 Overall, we
observe that the stabilisation performance of monetary policy does not deteriorate much
when the policy-maker follows simple interest rate rules rather than fully optimal poli-
cies under commitment. Under both Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore contracts the value of the
policy-maker’s loss function never rises by more than 6 percent. Interestingly, there is no
stabilisation gain from following forecast-based as opposed to outcome-based rules.21
Based on these results, one might conclude that relying on optimised interest rate rules
rather than optimal policies under commitment does not compromise the overall stabilisa-
tion performance of monetary policy signiﬁcantly and, hence, seems innocuous. However,
our analysis thus far has assumed that the policy-maker knows the true model of inﬂa-
tion determination when designing and implementing simple interest rate rules. As we will
see below, the stabilisation performance of these rules can deteriorate dramatically, if this
assumption is invalid.
4 The Robustness of Optimised Monetary Policy Rules
In the previous section it was assumed that the policy-maker knows the “true” model of
inﬂation determination as represented by either Taylor or Fuhrer-Moore contracts. For
each of these two contracting speciﬁcations, we designed optimal interest rate rules which
performed remarkably well in stabilising inﬂation and the output gap for given preferences
of the policy-maker. In the case that the optimised rules prescribed to set the interest rate
in response to forecasts of future inﬂation or the output gap, these forecasts happened to
be consistent with the structure of the model.
20See Finan and Tetlow (1999) for details on computing the optimal policy under commitment for large
rational expectations models using AIM.
21In the sensitivity analysis at the end of the paper we consider forecast-based rules which do not allow
for a direct response to the output gap. For such rules, it is found that extending the forecast horizon for
inﬂation beyond one year leads to an improved stabilisation performance relative to outcome-based rules or
rules that are conﬁned to short inﬂation forecast horizons.
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two distinct sources of policy mistakes can be identiﬁed when implementing and designing
interest rate rules. First, when implementing a forecast-based rule, the policy-maker may
erroneously rely on forecasts which are obtained from the false model of inﬂation deter-
mination. And second, the policy-maker may already rely on the false model of inﬂation
determination when designing the rule itself. We will refer to these two sources of policy mis-
takes as uncertainty about the forecasting model and uncertainty about the rule-generating
model respectively. Of course, in the latter case the risks may even be heightened when
also relying on the false forecasting model.
In the following we shall assess the robustness of optimised interest rate rules to uncer-
tainty about the true model of inﬂation determination by evaluating the costs associated
with these two distinct sources of policy mistakes.
4.1 Uncertainty about the Forecasting Model
Table 4 characterises the stabilisation performance of the optimised forecast-based policy
rules reported in Table 3 above under the assumption that the forecasts used when imple-
menting these rules have been generated by the false model of the inﬂation process. Column
four in Table 4 refers to the model with Taylor contracts and indicates the percentage point
change in the policy-maker’s loss function when interest rates are set according to a rule
which has been optimised under Taylor contracts (representing the true model of the inﬂa-
tion process) but implemented using inconsistent forecasts obtained from the model with
Fuhrer-Moore contracts. Here, the comparison is made with respect to the loss under the
optimised forecast-based rule that has been implemented with consistent forecasts. Vice
versa, column ﬁve refers to the model with Fuhrer-Moore contracts and reports the rela-
tive loss when the correctly designed policy rule is implemented using inconsistent forecasts
based on the model with Taylor contracts. In each case, the inconsistent forecast, E
j
t[·]( j
= T, FM), is computed under the forecast-based rule designed for the model which is sup-
posed to be the true representation of the inﬂation process, i.e. the policy-maker happens
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Inconsistent forecasts Pooled forecasts
θκλ %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM
1 0 0 0.26 0.66 0.08 0.16
1/2 0.09 0.55 0.09 0.13
1 0.15 0.53 0.15 0.13
2 0.19 0.55 0.19 0.12
4 0 0 20.21 70.87 3.07 6.89
1/2 4.56 61.94 2.31 5.85
1 3.13 69.43 1.95 5.98
2 2.37 95.51 1.72 6.81
4 4 0 22.03 61.55 3.86 6.24
1/2 4.25 42.15 1.20 5.27
1 2.98 35.97 0.74 5.13
2 2.28 29.80 0.42 5.19
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change
in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) when the optimised forecast-based rule is implemented using
either model-inconsistent or pooled forecasts, compared with the loss under the optimised forecast-based
rule implemented with model-consistent forecasts.
to choose the correct rule-generating model, but when implementing the optimal rule the
policy-maker resorts to the incorrect forecasting model.
The comparison of the outcomes reported in columns four and ﬁve of Table 4 reveals
that the deterioration of monetary policy is less severe, if the policy-maker overestimates
the degree of inﬂation persistence when implementing forecast-based policy rules (that is, if
forecasts that are based on Fuhrer-Moore contracts are incorrectly used in the model with
Taylor contracts.) In this case, the use of inconsistent forecasts leads to a percentage point
increase in the policy-maker’s loss function of up to 22 percent, depending on the length of
the forecast horizons and the policy-maker’s preferences. In contrast, if the policy-maker
underestimates the degree of inﬂation persistence (that is, if inﬂation forecasts based on
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the deterioration in the performance of monetary policy is more dramatic. In this case, the
loss increases by up to 71 percent. Overall, the deterioration is increasing in the length
of the inﬂation-forecast horizon, and it is found to be particularly large if the monetary
policy-maker puts no weight on output stabilisation. Interestingly, the deterioration in
the performance of forecast-based rules with forecast horizons extending farther into the
future seems to be alleviated at least somewhat if the horizon of the output gap forecast is
synchronised with that of the inﬂation forecast.
The remaining two columns in Table 4 provide information on the stabilisation perfor-
mance of optimised forecast-based rules if the policy-maker implements “pooled” forecasts,
which are deﬁned as a (simple) weighted average of the individual forecasts obtained under
the two alternative wage contracting speciﬁcations, ¯ Et[·]=1 /2(E T
t [·]+E FM
t [·]). In this
case, the percentage point increase in the policy-maker’s loss function is typically found to
be lower when compared with the percentage point increase in the loss function resulting
from the use of inconsistent forecasts. The relative improvement is found to be particu-
larly large for the model with Fuhrer-Moore contracts. Hence, as far as the choice of the
forecasting model is concerned, pooling forecasts rather than relying on any single model’s
forecast which may be largely misguiding can serve as a means to make forward-looking
monetary policies more robust.
4.2 Uncertainty about the Rule-Generating Model
Table 5 summarises our ﬁndings regarding the robustness of optimised interest rate rules
when there is uncertainty about the rule-generating model. We again consider the set of
benchmark rules documented in Table 3. To assess the consequences of relying on the
false model in the design of interest rate rules, we evaluate the stabilisation performance of
interest rate rules that are optimised for either of the two models of inﬂation determination
but then implemented in the alternative one which is supposed to represent the true model
of the inﬂation process. The deterioration due to this policy mistake is measured by the
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003 28Table 5: The Robustness of Optimised Rules when the Rule-Generating Model Is Uncertain
Consistent forecasts Inconsistent forecasts Pooled forecasts
θκλ %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM




1 0 0 18.92 154.97 23.14 229.83 20.87 186.35
1/2 6.95 82.63 10.22 ME 8.48 ME
1 7.05 99.67 10.06 ME 8.47 ME
2 6.86 103.44 9.53 ME 8.12 ME
4 0 0 8.93 58.94 33.23 558.68 16.44 88.10
1/2 1.99 27.45 18.82 ME 7.44 ME
1 3.09 47.06 18.10 ME 8.11 ME
2 3.45 63.86 16.77 ME 8.04 ME
4 4 0 9.70 44.28 25.29 615.45 13.88 79.17
1/2 1.49 20.41 18.92 ME 7.49 59.60
1 2.22 30.83 17.74 ME 7.76 93.18
2 2.62 34.95 15.93 ME 7.50 115.56
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change
in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) under the rule optimised for the “false” model, compared with
the loss under the rule optimised for the “true” model. Each of the forecast-based rules optimised for the
false model is implemented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The notation
“ME” indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria.
relative increase in the policy-maker’s loss function compared with the loss that would occur
under the correctly designed rule.
Starting with the optimised outcome-based rule in columns four and ﬁve of Table 5
(θ = κ = 0), we observe that the stabilisation performance deteriorates signiﬁcantly under
both types of wages contracts, with the performance being distorted most severely if the
policy-maker puts zero weight on output stabilisation. However, as shown in column four,
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  29if outcome-based rules that are optimised under the assumption that the degree of inﬂation
persistence is high (i.e. under Fuhrer-Moore contracts) are used in the low-persistence model
(i.e. under Taylor contracts), the value of the loss function never rises by more than 21
percent. In contrast, as shown in column ﬁve, using outcome-based rules optimised under
Taylor contracts within a model incorporating Fuhrer-Moore contracts results in distortions
that are dramatically larger. In the extreme case, the value of the loss function is found to
increase by about 225 percent.
We next turn to the forecast-based interest rate rules (θ>0,κ≥ 0). Here, we consider
three alternative assumptions regarding the formation of forecasts, as in Section 4.1 above.
First, we assume that the policy-maker uses forecasts obtained from the correct model of
the inﬂation process. In this case, the forecasts are model-consistent but the implemented
rule is poorly designed. As indicated in columns four and ﬁve of Table 5, using forecast-
based rules that are optimised under the wrong assumption regarding the degree of inﬂation
persistence results in a signiﬁcant deterioration in the stabilisation performance of monetary
policy, as has already been documented for the outcome-based rules above. Interestingly,
the deterioration is found to diminish with the length of the inﬂation-forecast horizons. For
the model with Taylor contracts, for example, the increase in the value of the loss function
amounts to 19 percent if one-quarter-ahead inﬂation forecasts are used, while the loss rises
by less than 9 percent when using one-year-ahead inﬂation forecasts. Comparing the results
for the two distinct contracting speciﬁcations, we observe that the relative increase in the
value of the loss function for the model with Fuhrer-Moore contracts is larger by an order
of magnitude.
Second, we assume that the policy-maker not only follows a poorly designed rule but
also relies on model-inconsistent forecasts when implementing this rule. By comparing
the results in columns four and six of Table 5, we observe that the deterioration in the
stabilisation performance of monetary policy continues to be relatively benign if forecast-
based rules optimised under Fuhrer-Moore contracts are implemented in the model with
Taylor contracts using forecasts that are based on Fuhrer-Moore contracts by mistake.
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implementing poorly designed rules together with inconsistent forecasts results in a dramatic
deterioration of the stabilisation performance of policy. The value of the loss function
increases dramatically. Even worse, in most cases the solution of the model turns out to
be indeterminate, with non-fundamental shocks eventually contributing to the variance of
economic ﬂuctuations themselves.
Finally, the results reported in the last two columns of Table 5 conﬁrm that forecast
pooling can in principle help to alleviate the distortions in the stabilisation performance
of forecast-based rules, at least to the extent that those distortions arise from the use
of inconsistent forecasts. The improvement however seems limited, in particular for the
model with Fuhrer-Moore contracts, that is, when the true degree of inﬂation persistence
is underestimated.
Overall, these results indicate that a cautious policy-maker who tries to avoid very poor
outcomes is well-advised to design and implement monetary policies under the assump-
tion that the degree of inﬂation persistence is substantial, as long as there is uncertainty
regarding the true characteristics of the inﬂation process.
5 Designing Robust Monetary Policy Rules
Having documented the potential lack of robustness of optimised interest rate rules which
rely on the assumption that either Taylor or Fuhrer-Moore-type staggered contracts cor-
rectly represent the inﬂation process, we ﬁnally proceed to identify the operating charac-
teristics of interest rate rules which perform reasonably well under both types of staggered
contracts.
In search of such robust policy rules we follow LWW (1999, 2003) and optimise the
response coeﬃcients of the parametric family of interest rate rules deﬁned in Section 3.1
across the two contracting models simultaneously by minimising the (simple) weighted
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θκλ ρ α β %∆LT %∆LFM
0 0 0 0.87 0.38 0.34 18.17 3.07
1/2 0.86 0.33 0.48 9.06 2.44
1 0.85 0.31 0.59 8.82 2.55
2 0.84 0.30 0.76 8.62 3.03
1 0 0 0.90 0.39 0.29 17.59 3.11
1/2 0.88 0.34 0.43 8.86 2.43
1 0.86 0.32 0.54 8.61 2.63
2 0.85 0.31 0.71 8.31 3.25
4 0 0 0.99 0.78 0.13 12.09 5.52
1/2 0.94 0.63 0.31 6.03 4.11
1 0.92 0.58 0.43 5.50 4.27
2 0.89 0.53 0.61 4.77 4.93
4 4 0 1.03 0.91 0.21 12.56 5.59
1/2 1.05 0.92 0.61 5.93 3.93
1 1.06 0.95 0.94 5.60 3.94
2 1.08 1.04 1.57 5.35 4.49
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ) and for each preference
parameter (λ), this table indicates the jointly optimised interest rate response coeﬃcients (ρ, α and β)a n d
the percentage point change in the contributions of the alternative contracting models to the policy-maker’s
overall loss function (%∆Lj) compared with the losses under the fully optimal policy under commitment
for those models.




(LT + LFM ).
Implicitly, the average loss function corresponds to the policy-maker’s expected loss function
when he has ﬂat prior beliefs regarding which of these two models is the correct represen-
tation of the inﬂation process.
Table 6 reports the response coeﬃcients of the jointly, i.e. robustly optimised interest
rate rules and indicates the stabilisation performance of these rules in terms of the percent-
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contracts models. Again, the comparison is made with the losses under the fully optimal
policies under commitment. As shown in columns four to six of Table 6, the size of the
response coeﬃcients of the robustly optimised rules is quite similar to the size of the opti-
mised response coeﬃcients that were obtained for the model with Fuhrer-Moore contracts
separately (see Table 3 above). In particular, the degree of interest rate inertia is rel-
atively high, and the short-run response coeﬃcients, notably those on inﬂation, turn out
to be relatively large.22 As indicated in the ﬁnal two columns of Table 6, the loss under
Fuhrer-Moore contracts increases only slightly when implementing the robustly optimised
rules, while the rise in the loss under Taylor contracts is somewhat higher, in particular, if
the weight on output stabilisation is zero, although still benign. Obviously, this contrasts
favourably with the lack of robustness of rules that have been optimised for a particular
model of the inﬂation process (see Table 5 above). Importantly, none of the robustly
optimised rules yields indeterminate equilibria.
Table 7 indicates the stabilisation performance of the forecast-based versions of the
robustly optimised rules reported in Table 6 when these rules are implemented using either
inconsistent or pooled forecasts. Here, the value of the policy-maker’s loss function under
the robustly optimised rule implemented with consistent forecasts is used as the benchmark
for comparison again. Overall, the distortions due to the use of inconsistent forecasts are
noticeable, in particular if the forecast horizon extends one year into the future. The results,
however, still compare favourably with those reported in Table 4, that is when relying on
rules that are optimised for the models separately. Notice, though, that using forecasts
based on Taylor contracts yields indeterminate equilibria in the model with Fuhrer-Moore
contracts if the policy-maker places either a very high weight on output stabilisation or
none at all.
22This is consistent with the ﬁndings in a study by S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002) who shows, by applying formal
Bayesian analysis to a simpliﬁed version of the Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) model, that heightened respon-
siveness is optimal when there is uncertainty about the parameters characterising the degree of inﬂation
persistence. The intuition is that a more aggressive response reduces uncertainty regarding the future path
of inﬂation.
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  33Table 7: The Stabilisation Performance of Robustly Optimised Rules when the Forecasting
Model Is Uncertain
Inconsistent forecasts Pooled forecasts
θκλ %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM
1 0 0 2.83 1.76 1.31 0.69
1/2 2.37 1.54 1.11 0.60
1 2.26 1.54 1.07 0.60
2 2.10 1.55 1.00 0.58
4 0 0 10.84 ME 7.42 12.62
1/2 16.93 77.46 5.55 6.37
1 15.64 100.55 5.34 6.98
2 14.37 ME 5.02 8.17
4 4 0 22.89 116.66 7.30 10.86
1/2 16.69 54.04 5.72 6.02
1 15.09 55.66 5.39 6.10
2 13.18 56.76 4.84 6.25
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change in
the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) when the robustly optimised forecast-based rule is implemented
using either model-inconsistent or pooled forecasts, compared with the loss under the robustly optimised
rule implemented with model-consistent forecasts. The notation “ME” indicates that the implemented
rule yields multiple equilibria.
As is evident from Table 6, one notable feature of the robustly optimised rules is the
rather high degree of interest rate inertia, in particular if the interest rate is set in response
to one-year-ahead inﬂation and/or output gap forecasts. This raises the possibility that
ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules that relate changes in the interest rate to inﬂation and output gap
forecasts which do not extend too far into the future may already go a long way towards
making policy rules robust to diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence.
Table 8 summarises the stabilisation performance of a ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule which relates
the change in the short-term nominal interest rate to the one-year-ahead forecast of annual
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0 17.11 5.20 20.63 69.34 6.20 6.98
1/2 9.00 5.60 17.16 51.73 5.44 3.95
1 14.58 9.23 15.23 40.68 5.02 2.04
2 26.33 18.40 13.15 27.58 4.56 -0.21
Notes: For each preference parameter (λ) and each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the
percentage point change in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) under the calibrated forecast-based
ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule. The ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule is implemented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled
forecasts respectively. The superscript “(1)” indicates the comparison with the loss under the fully optimal
policy under commitment, whereas the superscript “(2)” indicates the comparison with the loss under the
ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule implemented with consistent forecasts.
average inﬂation and the current output gap,
∆is
t =0 .75Et[˜ πt+4 − π∗ ]+0 .25yt,
with the response to the expected inﬂation gap calibrated to be somewhat stronger than to
the current output gap.
Evidently, the calibrated ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule performs remarkably well across the two
models of inﬂation determination, in particular when the policy-maker puts a modest weight
on output stabilisation. Also, the implementation of inconsistent forecasts always yields
determinate solutions, with pooled forecasts providing insurance against the adverse conse-
quences of choosing the incorrect forecasting model.
6 Sensitivity Analysis
Now we brieﬂy summarise some additional sensitivity analysis regarding the results pre-
sented above. First, we consider the implications of changing the weight µ on the variability
of interest rate changes in the policy-maker’s loss function. For the preceding analysis we
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of interest rate changes under the optimised simple rules is of the same order of magnitude
as the variability implied by the estimated benchmark rule. As shown in Table A-1 in
the appendix, with a weight of µ =0 .1 on interest rate variability, the relative stabilisation
performance of optimised rules is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected when compared to the baseline
results reported in Table 3 above. Similarly, we observe by comparing Table A-2 in the
appendix with Table 4 that the results regarding the robustness of optimised rules change
very little if the weight on interest rate variability is lowered to µ =0 .1. The costs of
making a policy mistake when the inﬂation process is in reality less persistent are not as
high as the costs when the inﬂation process turns out to be more persistent. Finally, as
documented in Table A-3, robustly optimised interest rate rules are yet again found to
perform amazingly well across the two alternative models of inﬂation determination.
Second, it is worthwhile to consider the stabilisation performance and robustness of
interest rate rules that respond to forecasts of inﬂation but do not allow for an explicit
response to the output gap. Such inﬂation-forecast-based rules have been widely used to
proxy the decision-making frameworks of central banks in inﬂation-targeting countries that
are widely perceived as setting interest rates in response to deviations of short to medium-
term inﬂation forecasts from the targeted rate. In these frameworks, information on the
output gap is only used to the extent that it helps to form forecasts of future inﬂation.
Table B-1 in the appendix indicates that the performance of such rules tends to improve
with increasing inﬂation-forecast horizon. In fact, extending the length of the inﬂation
forecast horizon to roughly two years leads to rules that perform best within the restricted
class of inﬂation-forecast-based rules under investigation. However, the costs of relying on
inﬂation forecasts based on the incorrect model of the inﬂation process is increasing with
the length of the forecast horizon as well. Most importantly, for the Fuhrer-Moore model
the use of inconsistent one-year-ahead and two-year-ahead forecasts yields either indetermi-
nate equilibria or explosive solution paths, regardless of the weight on output stabilisation.
As documented in Table B-2, optimised rules which only respond to inﬂation forecasts
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ﬂation process. Surprisingly, though, they tend to be less prone to yielding indeterminate
equilibria if the degree of inﬂation persistence is underestimated. Finally, as shown in Ta-
ble B-3, optimising inﬂation-forecast-based rules jointly across the two models of inﬂation
determination again helps to make them more robust, as long as the forecast horizon does
not extend too far into the future and the weight on output stabilisation is relatively low.
7 Conclusion
This paper examined the robustness of simple monetary policy rules to the diﬀerent degrees
of inﬂation persistence generated by two distinct staggered contracts speciﬁcations within
an estimated small-scale macroeconomic model of the euro area. Our central conclusion is
that rules assuming a high degree of inﬂation persistence are more robust. More speciﬁcally,
we ﬁnd that it may be dangerous to rely too heavily on rules that are designed and/or
implemented under the assumption that inﬂation persistence is low. These rules may result
in disastrous stabilisation outcomes if the inﬂation process turns out to be considerably more
persistent. In contrast, rules designed and/or implemented under the assumption that the
degree of inﬂation persistence is relatively high also perform reasonably well if inﬂation
persistence turns out to be low. Hence, a cautious monetary policy-maker is well-advised to
take monetary policy decision under the assumption that the economy is characterised by a
substantial degree of inﬂation persistence until strong evidence in favour of a low-inﬂation
regime has emerged. In this context, we also ﬁnd that using pooled forecasts rather than
relying on a single model’s forecast can serve as a means to insure the policy-maker against
risks arising from the use of the wrong forecasting model when there is uncertainty on how
to model the inﬂation process.
Regarding the key characteristics of simple monetary policy rules that are designed to
be robust to diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation persistence, we conﬁrm earlier ﬁndings by LWW:
robust rules respond to inﬂation and output gap forecasts with a horizon that does not
extend too far in the future. Furthermore, such rules also incorporate a substantial degree
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nominal interest rate to medium-term forecasts of inﬂation and the current output gap may
already go a long way towards making monetary policy robust to uncertainty regarding
the degree of inﬂation persistence. To the extent that such rules are found to perform
remarkably well under both types of staggered contracts speciﬁcations and given that the
uncertainty about inﬂation determination in the euro area looms large, we tentatively con-
clude that they may serve as a useful benchmark for model-based evaluations of monetary
policy in the euro area.
There are several directions in which the analysis presented in this paper could be
extended. First, while this paper has focused on the robustness of optimised interest rate
rules, it would be interesting to also investigate the robustness of the fully optimal policies
under commitment which were solely used as a benchmark for evaluating the stabilisation
performance of optimised interest rate rules. A ﬁrst attempt in this direction has been
undertaken in Angeloni, Coenen and Smets (2003), though a more rigorous analysis using
techniques developed in Giannoni and Woodford (2002) is left for future research. Second,
in the light of the good performance of ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules under both types of staggered
contracts, it would be interesting to compare the robustness of rules which target the price
level instead of the inﬂation rate, or a combination of both. Using simpler theoretical
frameworks, initial studies relevant to this have been provided by J¨ a¨ askel¨ a (2002) and
Batini and Yates (2002). Third, one could approach the robustness analysis using diﬀerent
methodologies. For example, one could design interest rate rules using an explicit minimax
criterion to avoid the worst possible outcome under either of the two staggered contracts
speciﬁcations. At least implicitly, part of the analysis in this paper has been following this
idea, and one may form a conjecture that a more formal analysis along this line would
also lead to favouring Fuhrer-Moore contracts over Taylor contracts. An example of a
formal analysis using the minimax approach is Giannoni (2002) who uses a stylised New-
Keynesian model though. Last, but not least, it would be important to check if the central
conclusion from the paper is sensitive to alternative models of inﬂation determination. This
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empirical models of the inﬂation process. The analysis presented in Angeloni, Coenen and
Smets (2003) is encouraging in this respect.
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ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003  43Table A-1: The Stabilisation Performance of Interest Rate Rules that Are Optimised with
aL o w e rW e i g h to fµ =0 .10 on Interest Rate Variability


















1 0 0 2.14 2.10 0.23 0.48 0.07 0.10
1/2 4.66 1.89 0.09 0.33 0.03 0.07
1 3.84 2.92 0.04 0.33 0.01 0.06
2 3.31 4.59 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.05
4 0 0 4.75 4.92 28.26 ME 10.37 4.31
1/2 5.38 3.39 3.89 33.85 0.94 3.41
1 4.14 4.51 2.79 48.18 0.68 4.18
2 3.42 6.60 2.10 75.45 0.52 5.68
4 4 0 4.82 4.91 17.98 53.20 3.84 4.00
1/2 5.50 3.17 2.07 26.19 0.46 3.36
1 4.52 4.12 1.21 28.54 0.28 3.61
2 4.05 5.98 0.79 27.93 0.18 3.77
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change
in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) under the optimised rule. Each forecast-based rule is imple-
mented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The superscript “(1)” indicates the
comparison with the loss under the fully optimal policy under commitment, whereas the superscript “(2)”
indicates the comparison with the loss under the optimised rule implemented with consistent forecasts.
The notation “ME” indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria.
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on Interest Rate Variability when the Rule-Generating Model Is Uncertain
Consistent forecasts Inconsistent forecasts Pooled forecasts
θκλ %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM




1 0 0 13.29 50.90 16.07 64.48 14.57 57.03
1/2 7.38 58.12 10.14 75.21 8.70 65.83
1 8.98 111.16 11.76 153.25 10.32 129.03
2 9.08 257.93 11.75 ME 10.37 ME
4 0 0 8.14 36.87 22.50 37.88 11.66 11.88
1/2 3.37 25.23 16.15 ME 7.92 61.54
1 5.17 35.21 18.10 ME 10.00 91.22
2 5.24 39.63 18.08 ME 10.04 115.63
4 4 0 9.27 38.24 23.37 94.86 12.94 41.42
1/2 2.62 30.17 16.82 188.38 7.94 61.59
1 4.44 47.79 18.43 308.81 9.91 91.65
2 5.15 57.55 18.25 ME 10.41 109.62
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change
in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) under the rule optimised for the “false” model, compared with
the loss under the rule optimised for the “true” model. Each of the forecast-based rules optimised for the
false model is implemented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The notation
“ME” indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria.
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1 0 0 11.14 3.40 1.84 1.35 0.84 0.56
1/2 9.83 2.54 1.95 1.28 0.93 0.52
1 10.42 3.60 2.12 1.33 1.01 0.53
2 9.94 5.23 2.15 1.33 1.03 0.53
4 0 0 10.64 5.65 13.98 33.31 1.54 5.03
1/2 7.80 3.69 12.97 40.76 4.58 4.34
1 7.09 5.07 13.96 58.45 5.13 5.70
2 5.77 7.22 14.07 82.13 5.14 7.05
4 4 0 10.42 6.05 14.20 33.74 3.75 5.17
1/2 7.72 3.32 13.07 30.05 4.85 4.45
1 7.95 4.42 13.17 31.73 5.13 4.92
2 7.88 6.31 12.23 29.18 4.92 4.95
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation and output gap forecast horizons (θ and κ), for each preference
parameter (λ) and for each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change
in the policy-maker’s loss function (%∆Lj) under the robustly optimised rule. Each forecast-based rule
is implemented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The superscript “(1)”
indicates the comparison with the loss under the fully optimal policy under commitment, whereas the
superscript “(2)” indicates the comparison with the loss under the robustly optimised rule implemented
with consistent forecasts.
ECB • Working Paper No 290 • November 2003 46Table B-1: The Stabilisation Performance of Interest Rate Rules that Are Optimised with-
out Allowing for a Response to the Output Gap


















1 0 6.84 27.73 -0.37 3.15 -0.33 1.04
1/2 47.96 35.39 -0.68 2.80 -0.58 0.92
1 74.20 41.84 -0.51 2.75 -0.54 0.89
2 107.59 52.13 -0.34 2.69 -0.47 0.84
4 0 6.52 8.88 17.60 ∞ 4.67 10.39
1/2 16.77 11.81 34.33 ME 10.80 9.56
1 27.79 15.53 44.31 ME 14.55 9.58
2 43.41 22.66 53.20 ME 18.03 10.43
8 0 15.44 5.68 40.95 ∞ -0.49 16.78
1/2 6.10 4.48 230.02 ∞ 63.89 14.22
1 7.19 5.27 338.89 ∞ 97.40 12.86
2 10.32 8.37 459.93 ∞ 135.77 11.90
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation forecast horizon (θ), for each preference parameter (λ) and for
each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change in the policy-maker’s
loss function (%∆Lj) under the optimised rule. Each forecast-based rule is implemented using consistent,
inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The superscript “(1)” indicates the comparison with the loss
under the fully optimal policy under commitment, whereas the superscript “(2)” indicates the comparison
with the loss under the optimised rule implemented with consistent forecasts. The notation “ME” indicates
that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞” indicates that the implemented rule
results in instability.
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to the Output Gap when the Rule-Generating Model Is Uncertain
Consistent forecasts Inconsistent forecasts Pooled forecasts
θλ %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM %∆LT %∆LFM




1 0 24.88 126.26 33.46 193.07 28.76 154.11
1/2 4.98 10.60 8.60 20.82 6.44 14.92
1 2.23 3.25 4.30 8.98 2.90 5.56
2 1.73 1.85 2.42 4.50 1.67 2.76
4 0 4.01 25.88 16.42 416.35 8.43 52.76
1/2 1.47 3.56 18.96 58.45 4.82 1.79
1 4.14 8.86 14.42 31.66 3.57 -0.38
2 9.72 17.28 11.32 13.40 3.96 0.98
8 0 -0.80 177.03 21.65 ∞ 1.17 9.43
1/2 9.57 66.46 17.33 ME 3.83 12.59
1 17.79 104.71 16.85 ME 7.08 24.40
2 29.14 148.59 17.84 ME 12.02 39.50
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation forecast horizon (θ), for each preference parameter (λ) and for
each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change in the policy-maker’s
loss function (%∆Lj) under the rule optimised for the “false” model, compared with the loss under the
rule optimised for the “true” model. Each of the forecast-based rules optimised for the false model is
implemented using consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The notation “ME” indicates
that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞” indicates that the implemented rule
results in instability.
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1 0 25.21 29.33 5.15 5.00 2.30 2.13
1/2 51.93 36.12 2.18 4.17 0.79 1.57
1 75.88 42.30 1.08 3.56 0.22 1.29
2 108.77 52.63 0.09 2.70 -0.31 0.89
4 0 10.07 9.03 28.70 154.65 5.99 20.11
1/2 17.90 11.95 19.70 150.19 4.45 7.26
1 31.02 16.03 15.53 ME 2.11 4.70
2 50.84 24.24 11.29 ME -0.39 1.39
8 0 14.49 5.69 23.31 ∞ -5.63 16.16
1/2 14.31 4.97 13.66 ∞ -2.87 9.44
1 21.47 6.47 9.99 ∞ -5.05 5.83
2 32.80 10.76 6.73 ∞ -7.22 1.74
Notes: For each choice of the inﬂation forecast horizon (θ), for each preference parameter (λ) and for
each contracting speciﬁcation (j), this table indicates the percentage point change in the policy-maker’s
loss function (%∆Lj) under the robustly optimised rule. Each forecast-based rule is implemented using
consistent, inconsistent and pooled forecasts respectively. The superscript “(1)” indicates the comparison
with the loss under the fully optimal policy under commitment, whereas the superscript “(2)” indicates
the comparison with the loss under the robustly optimised rule implemented with consistent forecasts. The
notation “ME” indicates that the implemented rule yields multiple equilibria; the notation “∞” indicates
that the implemented rule results in instability.
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